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The “origin” story of Resolution 1325 is probably amongst the most well-known narratives 
of successful feminist intervention in international politics.1 Becoming equally familiar is 
the narrative that the Security Council’s Women, Peace and Security (WPS) policy discourse 
has not lived up to the resolution’s transformative promise.2 The language of these critiques 
varies, but it is not uncommon to hear the accusation that those who are meant to be “working 
on the inside” for the feminist project have abandoned the struggle or, as is often averred, 
have “been co-opted.”3 This paper does not set out to dispute these claims and I mostly 
agree with their overall assessment of the “state of play” of WPS policy.4 However, I argue 
that interventions to secure particular feminist (or other) meanings in an institution such as 
the Security Council will “almost inevitably involve the most microscopic struggles around 
individual and institutional practices.”5 That is, if we want to understand courses of action 
in or by the Security Council, for example the acceptance or refusal of certain language in 
its policy texts, we must account for the prevailing possibilities of language in that space.6 
Laura Shepherd proposes we do this by paying 
analytical attention to “the discursive terrain 
of international institutions when analysing 
the formulation and implementation of 
security policy.”7 Although I provide a 
reading of this discursive terrain, this is not 
an account of the policymaking practices of 
the Security Council writ large. Rather my 
interest here is in exploring how feminists 
encounter and work within the practices 
of that space, its rules and procedures, its 
dominant ways of operating. The discursive 
terrain I am looking for is thus more than 
a place with distinct and finely detailed 
features and a layered history. It is all that. 
But it is also a place occupied, a position 
from which possible future action can and 
must be calculated. To trace the topography 
of this terrain, I explore a set of interviews 
with feminists who either are working or 
have worked to see feminist approaches and 
interests included within the Security Council 
as a WPS policymaking space. I read these not 
for a definitive account of Security Council 
practice, but as texts that provide an account 
of feminist intervention in, and through, 
the practices of that space.8 It was there 
that I encountered Metis, Titan goddess of 
good counsel, advice, planning, cunning, and 
craftiness, bearer of the cunning intelligence 
needed to act in a world of change.9
INTRODUCING METIS
As may become apparent in what follows, 
metis has a reputation for being hard to 
pin down and as impossible to define with 
any precision.10 Philologists Detienne and 
Vernant – the primary interlocutors of metis 
in contemporary social theory – describe 
it in their 1976 text Cunning Intelligence 
in Greek Culture and Society (Les Ruses 
de l’Intelligence) as “a complex but very 
coherent body of mental attitudes and 
intellectual behavior” that combines “flair, 
wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, 
deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, 
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21 As the co-editors Paul Kirby and Laura 
Shepherd remark in the 2016 special issue 
of International Affairs, “[t]he case for the 
novelty of UNSCR 1325 as both a Security 
Council resolution and a wide-ranging 
policy artefact has been made well, and 
often.” Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, 
“The Futures Past of the Women, Peace and 
Security Agenda”, International Affairs 92 (2) 
(2016), 373-392, 373.
2 See for example the critiques discussed 
in, Dianne Otto, “The Exile of Inclusion: 
Reflections on Gender Issues in International 
Law over the Last Decade”, Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 10 (1) (2009): 
11-26; Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, 
“Reintroducing Women, Peace and Security”, 
International Affairs 92 (2) (2016), 249-254; 
Laura J. Shepherd, “Power and Authority in 
the Production of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1325”, International Studies 
Quarterly 52 (2) (2008): 383-404.
3 See the discussion in Sara de Jong and Susanne 
Kimm, “The Co-Optation of Feminisms: A 
Research Agenda”, International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 19 (2) (2017): 185-200; and 
Gülay Caglar, Elisabeth Prügl, and Susanne 
Zwingel, “Introducing Feminist Strategies 
in International Governance” in Feminist 
Strategies in International Governance, ed. 
Gülay Caglar, Elisabeth Prügl, and Susanne 
Zwingel (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 
4-5. See also Amanda Gouws, “The Rise of the 
Femocrat?”, Agenda 30 (1996): 31-43.
4 There is, for example, little with which I 
can comfortably disagree in this broad 
2009 assessment of the “current” problems 
on display in the Security Council’s WPS 
policy as including: “a pattern of selective 
engagement with feminist ideas as they 
are instrumentalised to serve institutional 
purposes; an across-the-board absence of 
strong accountability mechanisms, even as 
the outside pressure for accountability grows; 
and the tendency for protective stereotypes 
of women to normatively re-emerge 
following an initial flirtation with more 
active and autonomous representations.” 
Otto, “Exile of Inclusion”, 12.
5 Alan Hunt, “Rights and Social Movements: 
Counter-Hegemonic Strategies”, Journal of 
Law and Society 17 (3) (1990), 309-328, 323.
6 David R. Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, 
“Introducing Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis”, in Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social 
Change, ed. David R. Howarth, Aletta J. 
Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), 18.
7 As Shepherd explains elsewhere, taking 
account of this terrain is to “take account 
of the operation of power in that space 
as productive of: practices of knowledge 
(including UNSC Resolutions), conditions 
of meaning (of those same Resolutions), 
and identity (as marked and made 
in the Resolutions, and elsewhere).” 
Laura J. Shepherd, “Sex, Security and 
Superhero(in)es: From 1325 to 1820 and 
Beyond”, International Feminist Journal of 
Politics 13 (4) (2011), 502-521, 514.
opportunism, various skills, and experience 
acquired over the years.”11 J. E. Tiles, for 
his part, sees the requirements of metis as 
“the exercise of continual alertness, careful 
control, and unfailing concentration.”12 
Elsewhere, to have metis is described as 
having the “know how to make use of a 
favourable situation.”13 In attempting to 
articulate metis, many point to activities, 
occupations or “ways of being” (not all 
of which are human) that exhibit metis. 
So, for example, “The fox and the 
octopus have metis. Hunters, fishermen, 
navigators, metalworkers, weavers, and 
potters exhibit metis.”14 Included in lists 
of activities requiring extensive metis are 
such occupations as “[s]ailing, boxing, 
fishing, and (more cooperatively) dancing 
or team sports” but also the activities of 
“professionals who respond to accidents 
or national disasters.15 And, directly relevant 
to thinking of feminist interventions in the 
Security Council as an enactment of metis, 
James C. Scott sees “[w]ar, diplomacy and 
politics more generally [as] metis-laden 
skills.”16 Detienne and Vernant acknowledge 
the distinct and varied contexts and levels 
at which metis operates and in this paper I 
have attempted to draw on the many forms 
in which the concept or figure appears.17 
In so doing I have let the slipperiness of 
metis remain – indeed this quality is part 
of its appeal.  
There are a number of reasons, very much 
intertwined, that are posited for the elusiveness 
of metis. These are related both to the qualities 
or characteristics of metis and, to “the particular 
image Greek thought created of itself” —  in 
which metis is conspicuous by its absence.”18 
Although this “aspect of mental cognition” 
has a stable role, as a mental category, through 
Greek antiquity, Detienne and Vernant note 
that “its presence as a master value in the Greek 
world remains largely implicit.”19 It is difficult 
to define with any precision or exactness.20 It 
appears, they argue “more or less under the 
surface, immersed in practical operations….
It is never made manifest for what it is, it is 
never clearly revealed in a theoretical work 
that aims to define it.”21 As they explain, 
the form of knowing represented by metis is 
“erased from the realm of true knowledge and 
relegated, according to the circumstances, to 
the level of mere routine, chancey inspiration, 
changeable opinion or even charlatanerie, pure 
and simple.”22 Whether or not one agrees 
with a schema of thought that sees “practical 
reason as ‘radically’ opposed to philosophical 
reason”, the way in which metis is understood 
in relation to other ways of knowing remains 
relevant (as will emerge in the discussion 
below).23  
But what of the other reason posited for this 
difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of defining 
metis with precision? That reason, as Harrison 
points out, is that metis is “found only in 
praxis, or better, it hides in praxis.”24 This 
characteristic of metis, this “embeddedness” in 
historically specific circumstance, is why metis 
serves as a useful “thinking tool”: as a logic of 
action, it presents a form through which the 
practices of feminist policy interventions in the 
Security Council can be analysed. To draw the 
connection between these practices and metis I 
return in the next section to the place in which 
my own encounter with metis began – de 
Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life; a work 
he frames, in his introduction to the English 
translation, as being “part of a continuing 
investigation of the ways in which users – 
commonly assumed to be passive and guided 
by established rules – operate.”25 I begin by 
working through an analysis of feminist policy 
interventions as akin to these practices of use 
and then move on, in the remainder of this 
paper, to outline an analysis of these ways of 
operating as enactments of metis. 
PRACTICES OF USE
To engage within the system and attempt to 
shift the prevailing discourse in the Security 
Council feminists must rearticulate or “use” 
its forms.26 By referencing the terms of the 
system, subordinate users are able to position 
themselves as intelligible in relation to what 
dominant actors already “know” – those 
forms that resonate with familiarity. Feminists 
operating within the Security Council space 
readily admit that they are required to work 
8 The subjects in these interviews have been 
anonymised so as to focus attention on the 
content of interviews as a text from which 
discursive practices can be read. Interview 
subjects are current or past participants in 
the “Women, Peace and Security” policy 
community of the Security Council as 
representatives of NGOs, Member States  
and the UN.
9 Metis does not appear as a major figure 
in Greek religion – there is no cult or ritual 
deifying her name. Metis, in the ancient 
Greek religious order, was a Titan elder and 
of an earlier age than Zeus – who she came to 
marry as his first spouse. Zeus, in attempting 
to avoids fate and the prediction that he 
will be defeated by his offspring, swallows 
Metis. But this is not the end for Metis. She 
works from within Zeus’ belly and crafts a 
helmet and robe for her fetal daughter. The 
hammering as she makes the helmet causes 
Zeus incredible pain and, depending on the 
account, his head is cleaved or smashed open 
and Athena is born – fully formed, armed and 
armoured. While Metis is written out of most 
histories of Athena’s birth, her son goes on to 
overthrow Zeus. And, in perhaps the greatest 
promise that the story holds, metis as a form of 
knowledge remains: the cunning intelligence 
needed to act in a world of chance. Marcel 
Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning 
Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society trans. 
Janet  Lloyd (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), 57.
10 Neumann attempted to familiarise the 
field of International Relations with the 
qualities of metis in his 2002 article - see 
Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the 
Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
31 (3) (2002), 627-651, 633. See also Corneliu 
Bjola and Markus Kornprobst, Understanding 
International Diplomacy: Theory, Practice and 
Ethics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 126. The 
authors there note that a decade later the 
concept remains widely neglected. This may 
be connected to the relative neglect in the 
discipline of practice-based approaches.
11 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, 
3.; Robert Pogue Harrison, “’The Ambiguities 
of Philology’, review of Cunning Intelligence 
in Greek Culture and Society, Jean-Pierre 
Vernant, Marcel Detienne”, Diacritics 16 (2) 
(1986), 14-20, 16.
12 J. E. Tiles, “The Cunning of Tradition”, review 
of Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in 
the Classical Tradition of China and Greece, 
Lisa Raphals, Philosophy East and West 44 (2) 
(1994), 387-395, 387.
13 Bjola and Kornprobst, Understanding 
International Diplomacy, 126.
14 Tiles, “The Cunning of Tradition”, 387.
15 James C. Scott, “State Simplifications: Nature, 
Space and People”, Nomos 38 (1996), 75.
16 Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic 
Turn”, 633.Goddess (presumed to be Metis) under Zeus’ throne
within a set of fairly rigid constraints.27 As 
CM succinctly put it, on being asked what 
was particular about feminist advocacy in 
that space: 
There is a set agenda. It is a very narrow 
focus. You have to relate everything to 
international peace and security. There 
are only these countries that are relevant 
in that specific time. They have their own 
national agenda.28
It is in this paradoxical position, of having to 
use the strictures of its forms in order to undo 
it, that those subordinated by the system work 
to create a space of politics. In de Certeau’s 
account, such ways of operating constitute 
“resistance to the historical law of a state of 
affairs and its dogmatic legitimations.”29 The 
creative and political project is to find ways to 
introduce elements believed to transcend the 
boundaries of the space.30 This understanding 
is one reflected by several of my interlocutors. 
Rather than seeing the limits as terminal 
points, the dominant practices of Security 
Council policymaking are seen as the material 
with which they must work and, as the source 
of inventiveness:
It’s sort of like being creative….it’s 
sometimes easier to be creative when 
you have limitations and I feel like the 
limitations of the Security Council make 
it a delicious place for advocacy.31 
In the analysis below, I explore these uses of 
the Security Council’s limits by those who, to 
use de Certeau’s terms, “are not its makers.” 
The creative potential of these articulations is 
not unlimited. I have explored elsewhere, for 
example, how the contested figure of the 
Woman-in-Conflict is produced in particular 
moments of representation by the everyday 
practices and relationships of power within the 
Security Council space.32 De Certeau argues, 
however, that this subordinate position in 
the systems of power is what underlies the 
creative logic of these ways of operating 
– a logic understood, he suggests, as the 
logic of metis.33 Like Foucault, de Certeau is 
concerned with the “microphysics of power” 
and, similarly, aims to “perceive and analyse 
the microbe-like operations proliferating within 
technocratic structures and deflecting their 
functioning.”34 However, he argues, only by 
analysing the ways of operating of those who 
are subordinate in the system (as feminists are 
417 Detienne and Vernant acknowledge that 
the varied contexts and levels at which 
metis operates are as different from one 
another as are: “theogony and a myth about 
sovereignty, the metamorphoses of a marine 
deity, the forms of knowledge of Athena and 
Hephaestus, of Hermes and Aphrodite, of Zeus 
and Prometheus, a hunting trap, a fishing net, 
the skills of a basket-maker, of a weaver, of 
a carpenter, the mastery of a navigator, the 
flair of a politician, the experienced eye of 
a doctor, the tricks of a crafty character such 
as Odysseus, the back-tracking of a fox and 
the polymorphism of an octopus, the solving 
of enigmas and riddles and the beguiling 
rhetorical illusionism of the sophists. Detienne 
and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, 2.
18 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, 
3. See too Marcel Detienne, “On Efficacy 
in Practical Reason: Comparative 
Approaches”, Arion: A Journal of Humanities 
and the Classics 20 (1) (2012): 43-60.
19 Harrison, “The Ambiguities of Philology”, 16. 
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday 
Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley; Los 
Angeles; London: University of California Press, 
1984), 81.
20 Harrison, “The Ambiguities of Philology”, 16.
21 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, 3.
22 Ibid., 4.
23 For further resources and a sense of this 
debate in relation to the place of metis, see 
Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, 3
24 Harrison, “The Ambiguities of Philology”, 16.
25 de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xi. 
His analytical focus is on the articulation of 
everyday or popular culture by those who 
are its “consumers” or “users” rather than its 
makers and where the available ways of using 
are determined within the system. Ibid., xiii. 
He is interested in this project in isolating that 
production of the system that takes place in 
the process of its utilisation.
26 De Certeau points out, “[i]n linguistics, 
“performance” and “competence” are 
different: the act of speaking (with all 
the enunciative strategies that implies) 
is not reducible to a knowledge of the 
language. ….By adopting the point of view 
of enunciation …. we privilege the act of 
speaking; according to that point of view, 
speaking operates within the field of a 
linguistic system; it effects an appropriation, or 
reappropriation, of language by its speakers; 
it establishes a present relative to a time and 
place; and it posits a contract with the other 
(the interlocutor) in a network of places 
and relations.” de Certeau, The Practice of 
Everyday Life, xi.
27 These observations emerge from my own 
work as a policy advocate in this space from 
2005-2010 for the UN office of the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom 
(WILPF) and from my reading of the interview 
transcripts referenced earlier. 
28 CM, Personal Interview, New York, May 2014.
29 de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 18.
in relation to Security Council policymaking) is 
it possible to “gauge the difference or similarity 
between the production of the image and 
the secondary production hidden in the 
process of its utilisation.”35 Thus, rather than 
making “clearer how the violence of order is 
transmuted into a disciplinary technology”, 
de Certeau’s goal is to find ways “to bring 
to light the clandestine forms taken by the 
dispersed, tactical and make-shift creativity 
of groups or individuals already caught in the 
nets of ‘discipline.’”36 
Beginning with Security 
Council Policymaking 
There is no one predictable policymaking route 
that can be easily traced in this space. CM, 
who gained advocacy experience in other 
multilateral institutions, affirms that there are 
certain basic logics to advocacy: 
the process of figuring out, here’s this 
body of decision makers, or here are 
these decision makers who I want 
to do something with and, who are 
the people who can influence them, 
that I knew, that is sort of the same 
everywhere; it’s just how does it apply 
to the Security Council.37 
But this is the trick of metis. As a distinctive 
technê it “is concerned always with the 
production and effectiveness of knowledge 
within ‘a particular sphere of activity.’”38 
The underlying organisation or “structures” 
of Security Council policymaking were the 
starting point in the account of several of my 
interlocutors; at a basic level, these are the 
limits contained in its mandate and agenda 
and its formal Rules of Procedure.39 However, 
equally important to understanding the 
dynamics of Council decision-making – and 
thus of interventions therein – are its working 
methods as these have developed in practice.40 
For those outside of the Council’s Permanent 
Membership, the Council’s working method “is 
set….a fait accompli.”41 But, as NT pointed out 
in discussing the benefits of the formal rules, 
“there is also a practice thing. You need to 
also know those rules in order to bend them 
and make your way through” or, as another 
government delegate remarked: “knowing 
when and how to play your cards becomes 
important.”42 In what follows, I begin to 
explore how feminists, although outside its 
formal processes, work with (and within) the 
Council’s practices of policymaking – these are 
their forms of use. 
The general ordering of the Council’s work and 
the elements it entails clearly underlies the logic 
of the NGO Working Group (hereafter NGO 
WG) on Women, Peace and Security’s primary 
ongoing project: the Monthly Action Points 
(MAP). Each month the group issues this, a 
“two page briefing note that provides analysis 
and advocacy entry points on country situations 
and thematic issues on the Security Council’s 
agenda for the forthcoming month.”43 This 
regular practice is part of a general attempt 
“to get the Council to incorporate and live 
up to this obligation on women, peace and 
security in its daily work.”44 This reflects an 
understanding of all potential Security Council 
actions as offering a space for intervention. 
As HM reflects,
that’s how we started on Women, Peace 
and Security, right? Like every single 
country resolution, we need to make 
sure that they put something in there 
about women in conflict. Whatever it 
is. And it’s not outlandish because its set 
out in 1325 and they’ve said its relevant. 
So we could tell them every time, this is 
not an outlandish idea, you should just 
remember to put this in.45
Understanding how the Council’s “daily 
work” – its agenda – is organised is the sort of 
knowledge of context that metis both requires 
and exhibits. So, for example, CM’s response 
that engaging with or advocating in relation 
to a proposed resolution, “depends on who 
is running it” is a determination that is, at 
one level, tied to whether the policy concerns 
an “Issue or a Country Situation.”46 This 
categorisation is, JS agrees, consequential to 
how the process of policymaking will proceed 
and, who will lead the drafting of any proposed 
texts. This is, in turn, determined by how the 
Council’s work is divided and responsibility 
30 Hunt, “Rights and social movements”, 
314; Kevin Adamson, “The Construction of 
Romanian Social Democracy (1989-1996)”, 
in Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: 
Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, 
ed. David R. Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and 
Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000); Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1985), 113.
31 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, 3; 
CM, Personal Interview, New York, May 2014.
32 Sam Cook, “The ‘Woman-in-Conflict’ at the 
UN Security Council: A Subject of Practice”, 
International Affairs 92 (2) (2016), 353-372.
33 de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xv.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., xiii. As he explains, “Confronted by 
images on television, the immigrant worker 
does not have the same critical or creative 
elbow-room as the average citizen. On the 
same terrain, his inferior access to information, 
financial means, and compensations of all 
kinds elicits an increased deviousness, fantasy, 
or laughter. Similar strategic deployments, 
when acting on different relationships of 
force, do not produce identical effects. Hence 
the necessity of differentiating both the 
‘actions’ or ‘engagements’ (in the military 
sense) that the system of products effects 
within the consumer grid, and the various 
kinds of room to maneuver left for consumers 
by the situations in which they exercise their 
‘art.’” ibid., xvii.
36 Ibid., xvii.
37 CM, Personal Interview.
38 Although this term technê is open to 
interpretation, Kopelson, defines technê as “a 
productive art, capable of becoming a ‘set of 
transferable strategies’ but incapable of being 
reduced to ‘a set of deductive postulates.’” 
Karen Kopelson, “Rhetoric on the Edge of 
Cunning; or, the Performance of Neutrality 
(Re)Considered as a Composition Pedagogy 
for Student Resistance”, College Composition 
and Communication 55 (1) (2003), 115-
146, 130. Detienne and Vernant, Cunning 
Intelligence, 11.
39 Niels Nagelhus Schia, “Being Part of the 
Parade–“Going Native” in the United 
Nations Security Council”, PoLAR: Political 
and Legal Anthropology Review 36 (1) 
(2013), 138-156, 140.
40 Ibid., 140.
41 Cited in Schia, “Being Part of the Parade”, 144. 
See also Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans, 
“Critical Methods in International Relations: 
The Politics of Techniques, Devices and Acts”, 
European Journal of International Relations 20 
(3) (2013), 596-619.
42 NT and GP, Personal Interview, New York,  
May 2014.
43 NGO WG, “Security Council Monthly Action 
Points (MAP) for the Security Council”, 
accessed 7 February 2018, http://www.
womenpeacesecurity.org/advocacy/map/
44 JS, Personal Interview, New York, May 2014.
45 HM, Personal Interview, New York, May 2014.
for drafting allocated amongst the Member 
States at the start of each calendar year.47 This 
categorisation also brings into play cycles of 
reporting and renewals that then, in turn, 
determine what must be addressed in any 
particular month’s programme of work.48
The NGO WG’s MAP, by setting out the specific 
asks of the group each month and in a public 
form, de facto creates a tool for monitoring the 
Council that implicitly recognises its working 
methods.49 It highlights the entry points that 
are created by the regularities of practice within 
the Council’s working methods – anticipated 
reports, meetings or mandates – and, in 
relation to these, articulates the NGO WG’s 
recommendations or desired outcomes:
[it] simultaneously points out where the 
[holder of the month’s Council presidency] 
is placing (hopefully) an emphasis on 
women, peace and security in its own 
priorities during its tenure for the month 
in the Security Council…. and then looks 
at what is expected on the Council’s 
agenda. So, looking to pull the Women, 
Peace and Security concerns into [the] 
country situations [that make up] the 
daily work of the council, the sort of 
bread and butter of the Council’s work. 
So, where is there a mandate expected, 
where is there a country report expected, 
where is the Council expected to hold an 
open or closed discussion on a country 
situation? So, is Afghanistan expected to 
have a mandate renewal and a country 
report? Is the council expected to discuss 
these things? 
This articulation within the MAP is more than a 
mere restatement of structure or a presentation 
of data in relation to a particular place or 
issue. As CM argues: “data is one thing but 
data doesn’t really mean anything unless you 
convert it into what specifically that means 
for [say] the resolution that they’re putting 
on the DRC.”50 The MAP takes the approach 
CM suggests and converts or translates those 
“facts” into recommendations for action:
therefore, when I say to you “do 
something ‘bout the women”, what 
I means is when you’re adopting the 
resolution it must have a reference to 
1325, it must say x, y or z. It must have 
an analysis, and here’s the analysis. So 
you’re sort of walking people through 
exactly what you mean.51
JS’s explanation of the MAP project 
confirms this: 
And then we say, okay, you’re expected 
to discuss these things. When you 
do, here are the Women, Peace and 
Security concerns that you should expect 
information on in that report that you’re 
receiving from the UN country team in 
Afghanistan. If you don’t receive that 
information, you should ask why you’re 
not receiving that information. You’re 
going to be renewing the mandate on 
Afghanistan? Here are the key concerns. 
Here is what was missing from the 
last one. Here is what you should be 
continuing in this one that was in the 
last one.52 
Understanding the scheme underlying the 
organisation of work in the Council provides 
a basic outline of how policymaking is 
organised and from there a view as to how 
it might proceed. The process leading to a 
resolution in relation to country-specific 
resolutions, for example is, in JS’s view, “pretty 
straightforward”:
You’re going to have a mandate renewal 
and you’re going to have a timetable 
…..And so, my understanding is that the 
penholder, upon taking advice from UN 
and experts will start to draft elements of 
a new document as needed. For a country 
situation they will consult with the host 
country. The consultations will be heavily 
influenced by the country report that 
will be due …. into the Council usually 
a month before the mandate renewal 
is due and that is the one that gets put 
together by country teams.53 
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From this perspective, policymaking might 
seem straightforward, and the entry points 
for advocacy defined or at least determinable. 
However, day-to-day policymaking, particularly 
for those outside the formal process, retains 
a high degree of unpredictability.54 Although 
the MAP offer possibilities for future action it 
does not capture how any particular action 
comes to be taken within such a context. It 
is in just such environments that metis comes 
to bear. As Scott explains, situations in which 
metis operates are distinctive in that:
(1) they are similar but never precisely 
identical, (2) they require quick and 
practiced adaptation that becomes almost 
“second nature” to the practitioner, (3) 
they may involve “rules of thumb”, but 
skill typically is acquired through practice 
(often apprenticeship) and a developed 
“feel” or “knack” for strategy, (4) they 
resist simplification to deductive principles 
which can successfully be conveyed 
through book-learning, and (5) the 
environments in which they are practiced 
are so complex and non-repeatable that 
formal procedures of rational decision-
making are impossible to apply.”55 
Working with Uncertainty
What particularly surprised HM when she began 
working in the Security Council policymaking 
space was “to find how random policy making 
is … especially on thematic areas.”56 As she 
went on to explain: “it is varied and complex 
and often accidental.”57 Even the renewal of 
existing peacekeeping mandates, which do 
follow a regular and predetermined schedule, 
can take unexpected directions. As HM puts it, 
“it can be as random as ‘well we’re going to do 
a mandate renewal for Somalia and there is a 
lot of coverage in the news right now because 
there have been a lot of attacks’ – it can be 
that random – that can suddenly lead to a 
particular focus or angle” within a mandate.58 
This is reflected too in LM’s suggestion that the 
ways in which policy emerges in the Council 
is very organic and seems always to change: 
“Each negotiation is different so in a way it is 
hard to measure….It really does seem like a 
new project, a new engagement on different 
things every single time.”59 
This unpredictability is, in part, a testament 
to the unpredictability of global politics and 
events to which the Council is expected to 
respond, and the willingness of its veto-holding 
members to do so. Furthermore, and as Niels 
Nagelhus Schia points out, formal structure can 
only be an initial anchor point: “it is difficult 
to understand organizations solely through a 
focus on structure, pretending that these exist 
independently of the actors that constitute 
the various positions in the structures.”60 For 
example, while the process of drafting may, 
on each occasion, follow a general pattern, 
the ultimate identity of the state taking 
the lead on the drafting can be of crucial 
importance in decision-making, because 
the character and tone of the original 
proposal will to some extent set the stage 
for all future debate on the issue.61 
In relation to the WPS space, the importance 
of individual state actors to the policymaking 
process adds to its unpredictability and, 
simultaneously, reinforces existing power 
relationships.62 As LM explains: 
I think for Women, Peace and Security 
right now, what I think is complicated is all 
the different processes because so many 
different actors want to take ownership. 
So countries have sprouted up with their...
like the UK with their Sexual Violence 
in Conflict Initiative that they have their 
experts on.63
Further complicating matters, and contributing 
to the sense that policymaking practice is 
ambiguous and uncertain, is the fact that, in 
the Security Council, “much of the negotiation 
process takes place in private and informal 
settings closed to all but those directly 
involved.”64 In the Security Council, informal 
contacts are often a first step in the negotiating 
process, “designed to see if there is support 
for holding formal meetings on a particular 
topic.”65 And, as a delegate in Schia’s study 
points out, “[s]imply calling delegates from 
62 As LM suggests, while on WPS there’s some 
sense of a progression through issues, “it’s 
moving from this to the other to the next, 
you know”, those with relative power in the 
system are able to shift how the process is 
understood and proceeds. That it is Permanent 
Members of the Council (the UK and the 
USA) who, every year, take a lead both on the 
themes seen as most directly pertaining to 
WPS work serves to entrench and reinforce 
their influence over the shape of the WPS 
Agenda – “they hold the pen, they have the 
institutional memory.” LM, Personal Interview. 
With the addition of France, these two 
Member States also control the majority of 
resolution drafting in relation to the Country 
situations under consideration. As JS explains: 
“for our thematics – which are WPS and Sexual 
Violence in Conflict, the US has the lead on 
sexual violence in conflict and the United 
Kingdom has the lead on Women, Peace and 
Security – and that is every year. So they hold 
the pen, they have the institutional memory. 
And then on the country situations, its usually 
I think, for every country situation, except for 
Afghanistan, it’s one of the P3 members who 
holds the pen. Afghanistan it’s an elected 
member.” JS, Personal Interview.
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other UNSC delegations or the lead country 
about a certain process was … an effective 
way of influencing a process even before it 
had actually been started.”66 This informality 
may account for the general neglect of political 
processes within the literature on the UN, or 
at least among those that wish to generalise 
its forms. As Courtney B. Smith notes:
[n]early every account of UN decision 
making authored by former practitioners 
and members of the press is replete with 
situations in which “behind-the-scenes” 
negotiations provided a catalyst for the 
formal decisions that were made.67 
The “private negotiations and informal 
consultations” that lie behind these catalytic 
moments are strenuously criticised for 
entrenching the power of the Council’s 
permanent members and they certainly 
present a challenge to feminist practices of 
inclusion and transparency.68 However, it is 
this informality, and thus ambiguity, of process 
that feminists and others outside the system 
can use to effect change:
for they can allow individuals an 
opportunity to shape the negotiations 
in a substantial way, giving certain actors 
(like small states and NGOs) avenues of 
influence they otherwise would have 
lacked and indicating that they are 
considered part of the “in-group” whose 
contributions are desired in regard to the 
issue at hand.”69
Although fraught with ethical challenges 
(produced by the counter-pull towards 
transparency to a broader feminist community), 
it is in these places that feminists find political 
potential. This then, is the moment – the space 
– of metis. As Corneliu Bjola and Markus 
Kornprobst explain, metis is precisely that which 
enables actors to seize moments of openness 
as “windows of opportunity” and to “not lose 
orientation when a community experiences 
situational difficulties in interpreting the 
world.”70 Indeed, the metis-laden occupations 
(such as those set out earlier) are, Scott argues, 
skills that “require constant adjustments and 
finely tuned reactions to an environment that 
cannot simply be controlled or engineered.”71 
For delegations proposing a resolution, there 
are few formal limits on their freedom to 
submit draft resolutions. Smith observes that 
a delegation’s first step in pursuing a proposal 
is (following an exchange with foreign ministry 
personnel at home) to “quietly circulate it 
among their close friends and allies” so as to 
assess and address initial reactions and ensure 
any text introduced has the endorsement of 
a core group.72 To improve the likelihood of 
the text’s acceptance, the delegation may, 
Smith suggests, “find it helpful to quietly 
consult members of the Secretariat for their 
knowledge of the language used in previous 
texts on the same issue.”73 Following this 
the improved text is “circulated to a larger 
group of interested parties” and consultation 
is thus underway before any public debate 
has begun.74  Whether or not they will have 
access to a particular process or its attendant 
texts is, for feminist advocates, fraught with 
uncertainty. It is possible only by relying on 
these behind-the-scenes moments and on 
relationships (even if not direct) with those 
who do have access.75 As JS explains:
And at some point in there, either with 
what is called the zero-draft (which is the 
first draft) or after the several drafts that 
follow after certain sets of negotiations 
– at some point in there a version will get 
leaked to NGOs – it will fall off the back 
of a truck, or various parts of the text will 
fall off the back of a truck.76
In the Security Council context, having sight 
of the policy text is only the initial point for 
intervention. Advocates need to “make use 
of” the opening for it to be meaningful. So, 
for example, CM explains:
you reach out to the people you 
think might be also interested in this 
thematic resolution and maybe they 
have something – you see if they have a 
process going of giving joint comments, 
you know because the more civil society 
is coordinated, the more it’s heard. That’s 
one of those things – diplomats don’t like 
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88 Beyond the ability of this institutional actor 
to be constantly present, the form of their 
intervention is to provide their input in the 
form already accepted in the system: “his great 
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to … it’s not that they don’t like to think 
… I’ll be fair … a lot of them are incredibly 
overworked. So a lot of them like it 
chewed out as much as possible – they 
would rather not have to do the research 
about what’s, you know previously agreed 
language, whether this has ever come 
up before. You need to know whether 
you are proposing is totally outlandish or 
something that’s already been done five 
times before and they just actually need 
to know how to put it in here.”77 
From the discussion thus far, metis looks to 
be a “power”, something of which actors are 
possessed: the “know how” and “acquired 
experience” to see openings and turn them 
into opportunities. This does not, however, 
necessitate a return to a purely agential 
account of action. De Certeau, in fact, rejects 
approaches that would reduce these practices 
of use to the actions of atomistic individuals 
with static, pre-formed interests or ideas who 
operate according to dominant Western 
models of reason and rationality. He argues 
that it is essential that the enquiry focus on 
practices of use as “modes of operation or 
schemata of action” rather than directly on 
individual actions or “the subjects (or persons) 
who are their authors.”78 
LOGICS OF USE: FROM 
PRACTICE TO TACTIC
In order to undertake an enquiry into practices 
of use, “[in] order to think them”, as de 
Certeau puts it,
one must suppose that to these ways of 
operating correspond a finite number of 
procedures (invention is not unlimited 
and, like improvisations on the piano or on 
the guitar, it presupposes the knowledge 
and application of codes), and that they 
imply a logic of the operation of actions 
relative to types of situations.79 
As he explains, the procedures allowing 
the re-use of products are linked together 
in a kind of obligatory language, and their 
functioning is related to social situations 
and the way power operates in those at a 
moment in time.80 Knowledge of these limits 
– learned through interacting with them as 
feminist advocates do – is itself part of metis.81 
Recognising a particular social constellation as 
ripe for intervention requires, in the present 
case, knowing and applying the codes of 
policymaking practice. It is through these 
“improvisations” that actors attempt to 
reconstitute the discursive field.82 It is here 
that metis might be found. As de Certeau 
reminds us, being constructed with/within the 
“vocabularies of established languages” these 
ways of making-do remain “subordinated 
to the prescribed syntactical forms” of the 
social space.83 But, as suggested earlier, this 
subordinate position underlies the logic of 
metis. Such action de Certeau points out, has 
“as its precondition, contrary to the procedures 
of Western science, the non-autonomy of its 
field of action.”84 To capture these moments 
not in their static singularity but as “ways of 
using” that obey their own logic, de Certeau 
suggests a distinction between modes of action 
that are strategic and those that are tactical.85 
The former, available to subjects of “will and 
power”, represents a type of knowledge that 
is, “sustained and determined by the power 
to provide oneself with one’s own place.”86 
In the Security Council this place of strategy 
is, at a formal level, only available to Council 
members and, perhaps more accurately, 
only to the P5.87 However, the ability to 
command institutional resources allows even 
those without a formal place to engage 
substantively across a wide terrain. HM 
posits, for example, that one of the reasons 
the Council is “obsessed with sexual violence 
and not women’s leadership” is that the office 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on Sexual Violence in Conflict “has 
a staff of ten or fifteen whose only job is to 
lobby member states. That is all they do … go 
around and lobby member states, and pester 
them … on every single resolution … every 
month.”88 The NGO Working Group on the 
other hand, is in a far different position and 
only just able to cover the five to seven country 
situations in their MAP: “there’s no capacity 
in the office, even in the working group writ 
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large, to do that kind of concerted advocacy 
in the Council with those members” except 
around a “really major renewal” or “for a new 
mission.”89 This position – of being without 
the “power” to shift the game – is the tactical 
position, the place of action in the “space of 
the other.”90As much as a strategy is organised 
“by the postulation of power”, a tactic is 
determined by the absence of a proper locus.91 
A tactic, insinuates itself into the other’s place, 
fragmentarily, without taking it over in its 
entirety, without being able to keep it at a 
distance. It has at its disposal no base where 
it can capitalise on its advantages, prepare its 
expansions, and secure independence with 
respect to circumstances.92
Whereas strategies might impose totalising 
discourses, a tactic “must play on, and with, 
the terrain imposed on it and organised by 
the law of a foreign power”, in “isolated 
actions, blow by blow.”93 For de Certeau, 
these tactical ways of operating, like that of the 
storyteller, are akin to metis. In Detienne and 
Vernant’s telling, there are three elements that 
differentiate metis “more clearly from other 
sorts of behaviour” and as “characteristic of 
the stories that tell about it.”94 These elements 
are, he argues, “constituted by three relations 
of metis, to the ‘situation,’ to disguise, and to 
a paradoxical invisibility.”95 In what remains 
of this paper I set out the beginnings of an 
analysis of feminist interventions in terms of 
the first two of these elements. The third – the 
relation of metis to paradoxical invisibility – is 
not explored here but might be thought of as 
indicating that the creative possibilities of metis 
are to be found in its obliqueness.96
DISGUISE: IN THE PLACE  
OF ANOTHER
Having no proper place in the system, 
feminist WPS advocates rely on the existing 
practices of policymaking. But this playing 
“on the place of the other” extends to other 
levels. The effectiveness of metis is that it is 
fully contextual and, Detienne and Vernant 
note, “willingly operates through reversal, 
deception, and disguise when necessary.97 It 
does not, Kopelson suggests, “concern itself 
with ‘true being’ or ‘unchanging essences.’” 
In fact, she goes on to say, “one possessed 
of metis “takes the form” required “to deal 
with whatever comes up” in “circumstances of 
conflict” and amidst “the difficulties of practical 
life with all its risks.”98 In relation to feminist 
WPS advocates, CM suggests that “being 
relatable” is critical to successful advocacy. An 
effective advocate is not only briefable and 
good at relationship building, but “likeable 
and physically relatable. Somebody who can 
go into a room and look like the enemy.”99 
This relatability opens political space:
They can relate to you. Right? Here’s a 
person. I understand this person. This 
person is not trying to change too much. 
This is where the fear is. This person is 
wearing a suit. This person is one of my 
people. So maybe I should listen.”100
But relatability goes beyond appearance: 
“[p]eople will tell you”, says CM, “that 
... you can’t go into a meeting with your 
advocacy agenda and go through your points 
robotically. You have to listen to what that 
person wants and needs from you and you 
have to be able to anticipate so that you have 
that information.”101 Identifying the specific 
pressure points of those with relative power in 
the situation and convincing them to act based 
on their own interests is a tactical approach:
it is also about kind of knowing where the 
room is, for what is possible and what is 
impossible and then trying to push it. So 
[you need] a political sense of who wants 
what in the room and after a while you kind 
of know it, you know the reactions and it 
is about trying to avoid those poisonous 
terms and finding alternative ways and that 
can take a bit of creativity sometimes.102
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Amongst UN member states, for example, 
says HM “there is a huge amount of 
attention to the optics of collaboration” and 
in particular in respect of the relationship 
between the Western states and those from 
the Global South:
I do think with 1820 and with sexual 
violence in general, it was extremely 
important to have the Ghanaian 
Ambassador … who took a key role in 
the sexual violence conversation and in 
1820 … He was really vocal and active 
with the other council members – pushing 
them to do something. And of course it 
was important for them to be seen to 
working with an African leader on this.103 
This desire to be seen in a particular relationship 
to issues or other actors in the space is 
something that several of my interlocutors 
marked out as a primary pivot in persuading 
government representatives to a different 
way of thinking:
you give them coverage – right. You’re 
like, “okay if you do this then I’ll say that 
I did this other thing. Sometimes it’s that 
blatant. You’re giving people cover to 
do something. And sometimes it’s like 
you’re doing the opposite right, saying 
‘if you’re not doing this I cannot go tell 
my constituency that I think you’re a 
good guy’”. 
[Sam Cook: you don’t get the civil society 
stamp of approval?]
yeah and to some countries that is 
incredibly important. They want you to 
say that they are okay.”104
This desire is one that differently placed 
feminists are able to leverage to good effect 
in their version of the “good cop, bad cop 
thing” where, says HM:
of course I am within the UN so I have to 
be good but the NGO WG, Peacewomen 
can be much more critical. And I have 
definitely worked closely with JS in 
particular on encouraging her to write 
sort of critical letters about certain things. 
I can’t remember any particular one right 
now. So where we would be there with 
Member States saying “oh you’ve been 
criticised, well here’s some information 
that would be useful etc”.105 
Within an environment where individuals 
primarily function as representatives of an 
abstract legal subject, the interests of those 
individuals and their place in other hierarchies 
also have to be taken into account.106 
Furthermore, contributions of specific text 
are only accepted if they are recognised within 
the system. “I mean with the Security Council”, 
says CM:
what they care about is – the mandate is 
international peace and security – not that 
they necessarily care about that – but on 
the surface that’s what they care about. 
So you have to relate it to that. So figure 
out what it is, what’s there.
[Sam Cook: it’s like you have some 
building blocks and it’s up to you to build 
the castle?]107
CM agreed with this characterisation and 
that much of successful advocacy depends 
on finding, and responding to, the desires or 
position of those with power in terms that 
resonate. This adaptability and relatability is an 
important aspect of the logic of metis. But, as 
CM commented in affirming this point: “and 
then there’s the lucky breaks.”108
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RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
SITUATION
The relationship of metis to the situation, 
as de Certeau frames it, is that metis 
counts and plays on the right point in time 
(kairos): it is a temporal practice.”109 The 
right moment for an action, the “occasion” 
as de Certeau terms it, is a nexus critical 
to the success of everyday practices, to 
what it is to enact metis.110 Many of the 
successful efforts Jo Becker documents in 
Campaigning for Justice: Human Rights 
Advocacy in Practice “might not have been 
possible under other circumstances.”111 It is, 
however, impossible to define in advance 
what “the occasion” or “moment of 
opportunity” will be that sees the effort 
succeed.112 It is, de Certeau argues, “a fact 
that cannot be detached from the ‘turn’ or 
‘trick’ that produces it, because each time 
it is inserted in a sequence of elements, 
it distorts their relationships.”113 If we 
explore CM’s narrative of Resolution 1889 
it becomes clear that the “lucky break” 
she identifies is one constructed out of the 
positions and dynamics of power in the 
Council in that moment:
[w]ith 1889, with Vietnam, they came 
right after the US. The US had had 
the presidency during September so 
Hillary Clinton was there so she had 
presided over the session on Women, 
Peace and Security. So then when it 
came up in October – oh and there 
was a resolution that came out of that 
[in September] – and so in October 
for Vietnam, of course there had to 
be something on Women, Peace and 
Security in October.114
At first glance there may be little in this 
account that explains why this is a moment 
of opportunity. To appreciate this requires 
situating it in the context or relations of 
power of the WPS policy space at that 
moment and understanding any singular 
intervention as part of a wider context. 
CM begins her account not with Vietnam’s 
national interests or desires in terms of 
policy outcomes, but with the fact of the 
US having held the Council presidency in 
September 2009 and, having used that 
opportunity to adopt a resolution – SCR 
1888 on sexual violence in conflict (a follow 
up to SCR 1820 adopted in June of the 
preceding year). That it was October meant 
that “of course there had to something on 
women, peace and security”, the Open 
Debate and other activities in this month 
having become, by practice, focused on 
WPS. The pressure point, which transformed 
this set of circumstances into an “event”, 
came in the form of then US Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton having presided 
over the adoption of a WPS Resolution 
in September. There are any number of 
reasons this might have been the case: it 
was the first US Council presidency under 
the newly elected Obama administration 
and it wanted to signal the importance 
of the occasion; her attendance was part 
of the high-level representation common 
at the UN during the General Assembly’s 
annual opening session; Clinton had long 
been a high-profile supporter of women’s 
rights issues; and/or perhaps the US wanted 
to signal the seriousness with which they 
take the issue of sexual violence in conflict. 
In any event, when Vietnam took up the 
Council presidency in October and were 
thus pegged to preside over a Security 
Council Open Debate on WPS, the value 
of particular status symbols in that space 
became, at least in retrospect, a point of 
leverage for advocates:
yes, they were like, they wanted their 
foreign minister [to preside] also but 
you couldn’t have their foreign minister 
without also having a resolution – so if 
they had to have a resolution it had to 
be actionable. We kept on sort of like 
… “this looks like a press statement or 
a presidential statement” (or whatever 
they had), it has to have something 
actionable.115 
And that, says CM, is “how we moved from 
[a focus on] sexual violence to women’s 
participation. … it was the one-upmanship 
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between Hillary Clinton and Vietnam’s 
foreign minister.”116 This example illustrates 
Kopelson’s argument that metis involves 
mastery over time – “an ability, that is, not 
simply to seize the moment but to seize it 
with forethought, preparedness, and thus 
with foresight as to how events should 
unfold.”117 As Becker notes, however, 
advocates “can take steps to make sure 
that they are prepared to maximise their 
potential when they do.”118 
In another example, LM explains, feminist 
activists pushing for a more balanced WPS 
agenda were able to leverage the desire of 
the office of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict for a resolution on sexual violence, 
into support for a future resolution on 
mediation and peacebuilding – Resolution 
2122 – only a few months after the adoption 
of Resolution 2106. Says LM: “we never 
would have got 2122 without 2106 I think 
simply because there was no strategy in 
place to get it.”119 It was not that those in 
the WPS community had not considered the 
elements needed to enforce the Council’s 
commitments in this area but, LM explained, 
“we hadn’t proactively said, this October” 
and having to scramble to get the details for 
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Feminists rely on their ability to articulate their positions 
within the dominant practices of the Security Council 
space. What makes this possible is that this space is 
characterised by uncertainty and unpredictability. 
Rather than being paralysed by their subordinate 
position within this context, feminist interventions rely 
on ambiguous spaces – whether within concepts, tropes 
such as the Woman-in-Conflict, or the informality of 
process – to create a space of politics.
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that in place in time meant that ultimately, 
the introduction of “2106 forced the other 
aspects of the agenda to step up.”120 This 
turning to advantage is not accidental or 
behaviour on a whim but part of careful and 
constant attentiveness to the environment. 
This, too, is metis.
Feminist Possibilities
As I have demonstrated in the preceding 
discussion, feminists rely on their ability 
to articulate their positions within the 
dominant practices of the Security Council 
space. What makes this possible is that 
this space is characterised by uncertainty 
and unpredictability. Rather than being 
paralysed by their subordinate position 
within this context, feminist interventions 
rely on ambiguous spaces – whether within 
concepts, tropes such as the Woman-in-
Conflict, or the informality of process – to 
create a space of politics. It is these “non-
spaces” that are tactically exploited in 
order to intervene and it thus makes sense 
that metis is sometimes understood as a 
“knowledge of ambiguity”.121 The feminist 
interventions discussed here suggest a deep 
and enacted knowledge of the practices and 
relations of power in the Security Council 
and as characteristic of the behaviours of 
metis in their relation to the “‘situation,’ to 
disguise, and to a paradoxical invisibility.”122 
In articulating the terms of the system (in 
terms of both timing and form) feminists 
are able to place themselves as legible in 
relation to that which is already known – 
those forms that resonate with familiarity 
as “belonging.”123 Although not offering 
an escape from the dominant practices of 
Security Council policymaking, this position is 
one from which the creative potential of metis 
can be realised and elements introduced 
that might transcend the boundaries of the 
system. This turning to advantage is not 
accidental or behaviour on a whim but, I 
have argued, part of a careful and constant 
attentiveness to the environment that is an 
embodied articulation of metis. 
